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Abstract. Recently, there has been a surge in interest in safe and robust tech-
niques within reinforcement learning (RL). Current notions of risk in RL fail to
capture the potential for systemic failures such as abrupt stoppages from system
failures or surpassing of safety thresholds and the appropriate responsive controls
in such instances. We propose a novel approach to fault-tolerance within RL in
which the controller learns a policy can cope with adversarial attacks and random
stoppages that lead to failures of the system subcomponents. The results of the
paper also cover fault-tolerant (FT) control so that the controller learns to avoid
states that carry risk of system failures. By demonstrating that the class of prob-
lems is represented by a variant of stochastic games, we prove the existence of a
solution which is a unique fixed point equilibrium of the game and characterise
the optimal controller behaviour. We then introduce a value function approxi-
mation algorithm that converges to the solution through simulation in unknown
environments.
1 Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) provides the promise of adaptive agents being able to
discover solutions merely through repeated interaction with their environment. RL has
been deployed in a number of real-world settings in which, using RL, an adaptive agent
learns to perform complex tasks, often in environments shared by human beings. Large
scale factory industrial applications, traffic light control (Arel et al., 2010), robotics
(Deisenroth et al., 2013) and autonomous vehicles (Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2016) are no-
table examples of settings to which RL methods have been applied.
Numerous automated systems are however, susceptible to failures and unanticipated
outcomes. Moreover, many real-world systems amenable to RL suffer the potential
for random stoppages and abrupt failures; actuator faults, failing mechanical system
components, sensor failures are few such examples. In these settings, executing prepro-
grammed behaviours or policies that have been trained in idealised simulated environ-
ments can prove vastly inadequate for the task of ensuring the safe execution of tasks.
Consequently, in the presence of such occurrences, the deployment of RL agents intro-
duces a risk of catastrophic outcomes whenever the agent is required to act so as to
avoid adverse outcomes in unseen conditions. The important question of how to control
the system in a way that is both robust against systemic faults and, minimises the risk
of faults or damage therefore arises.
In response to the need to produce RL algorithms that execute tasks with safety guar-
antees, a significant amount of focus has recently been placed on safe execution, robust
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control and risk-minimisation (Garcıa and Ferna´ndez, 2015). Examples include H∞
control (Morimoto and Doya, 2001), coherent risk, conditional value at risk (Tamar et al.,
2015). In general, these methods introduce an objective1 defined with an expectation
measure that either penalises actions that lead to greater uncertainty or embeds a more
pessimistic view of the world (for example, by biasing the transition predictions towards
less desirable states). In both cases, the resulting policies act more cautiously over the
horizon of the problem as compared to policies trained with a standard objective func-
tion.
Despite the recent focus on safe methods within RL, the question of how to train
an RL agent that can cope with random failures remains unaddressed. In particular, at
present the question of how to produce an RL policy that can cope with an abrupt failure
of some system subcomponent has received no systematic treatment. Similarly, the task
of addressing how to produce RL policies that account for the risk of states in which
such failures occur has not been addressed.
In this paper, we for the first time produce a method that learns optimal policies in
response to random and adversarial systems attacks that lead to stoppages of system
(sub)components that may produce adverse events. Our method works by introducing
an adversary that seeks to determine a stopping criterion to stop the system at states that
lead to the worst possible (overall) outcomes for the controller. Using a game-theoretic
construction, we then show how a policy that is robust against adversarial attacks that
lead to abrupt failure can be learned by an adaptive agent using an RL updating method.
In particular, the introduction of an adversary that performs attacks at states that lead to
worst outcomes generates experiences for the adaptive RL agent to learn a best-response
policy against such scenarios.
To tackle this problem, we construct a novel two-player stochastic game (SG) in
which one of the players, the controller, is delegated the task of learning to modify
the system dynamics through its actions that maximise its payoff and an adversary or
‘stopper’ that enacts a strategy that stops the system in such a way that maximises the
controller’s costs. This produces a framework that finds optimal policies that are robust
against stoppages at times that pose the greatest risk of catastrophe.
The main contribution of the paper is to perform the first systematic treatment of the
problem of robust control under worst-case failures. In particular, we perform a formal
analysis of the game between the controller and the stopper. Our main results are cen-
tered around a minimax proof that establishes the existence of a value of the game. This
is necessary for simulating the stopping action to induce fault-tolerance. Although min-
imax proofs are well-known in game theory (Shapley, 1953; Maitra and Parthasarathy,
1970; Filar et al., 1991), replacing a player’s action set with stopping rules necessitates
a minimax proof (which now relies on a construction of open sets) which markedly dif-
fers to the standard methods within game theory. Additionally, crucial to our analysis is
the characterisation of the adversary optimal stopping rule (Theorem 3).
Our results tackle optimal stopping problems (OSPs) under worst-case transitions.
OSPs are a subclass of optimal stochastic control (OSC) problems in which the goal
is to determine a criterion for stopping at a time that maximises some state-dependent
payoff (Peskir and Shiryaev, 2006).
1 With a Lagrangian approach, constraints are captured in the construction of the Lagrangian.
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The framework is developed through a series of theoretical results: first, we establish
the existence of a value of the game which characterises the payoff for the saddle point
equilibrium (SPE). Second, we prove a contraction mapping property of a Bellman
operator of the game and that the value is a unique fixed point of the operator. Third,
we prove the existence and characterise the optimal stopping time. We then prove an
equivalence between the game of control and stopping and worst-case OSPs and show
that the fixed point solution of the game solves the OSP.
Finally, using an approximate dynamic programmingmethod, we develop a simulation-
based iterative scheme that computes the optimal controls. The method applies in set-
tings in which neither the system dynamics nor the reward function are known. Hence,
the agent need only observe its realised rewards by interacting with the environment.
1.1 Related Work
At present, the coverage of FT within RL is limited. In (Zhang and Gao, 2018) RL is ap-
plied to tackle systems in which faults might occur and subsequently incur a large cost.
Similarly, RL is applied to a problem in (Yasuda et al., 2006) in which an RL method for
Bayesian discrimination which is used to segment the state and action spaces. Unlike
these methods in which infrequent faults from the environment generate negative feed-
back, our method introduces an adversary that performs the task of simulating high-cost
stoppages (hence, modelling faults) that induce an FT trained policy.
A relevant framework is a two-player optimal stopping game (Dynkin game) in
which each player chooses one of two actions; to stop the game or continue (Dynkin,
1967). Dynkin games have generated a vast literature since the setting requires a markedly
different analysis from standard SG theory. In the case with one stopper and one con-
troller such as we are concerned with, the minimax proof requires a novel construction
using open sets to cope with the stopping problem for the minimax result. Presently, the
study of optimal control that combines control and stopping is limited to a few studies
e.g. Chancelier et al. (2002). Similarly, games of control and stopping have been anal-
ysed in continuous-time (Bayraktar et al., 2011; Baghery et al., 2013; Mguni, 2018). In
these analyses, all aspects of the environment are known and in general, solving these
problems requires computing analytic solutions to non-linear partial differential equa-
tions which are often analytically insoluble and whose solutions can only be approxi-
mated numerically at very low dimensions.
Current iterative methods in OSPs (and approximated dynamic programming meth-
ods e.g. Bertsekas (2008)) in unknown environments are restricted to risk-neutral set-
tings (Tsitsiklis and Van Roy, 1999) — introducing a notion of risk (generated adver-
sarially) adds considerable difficulty as it requires generalisation to an SG involving
a controller and stopper which alters the proofs throughout. In particular, the solution
concept is now an SG SPE, the existence of which must be established. As we show, our
framework provides an iterative method of solving OSPs with worst-case transitions in
unknown environments and hence, generalises existing OSP analyses to incorporate a
notion of risk.
Organisation
The paper is organised as follows: we firstly give a formal description of the FT RL
problem we tackle and the OSP with worst-case transitions and give a concrete example
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to illustrate an application of the problem. In Sec. 2, we introduce the underlying SG
framework which we use within the main theoretical analysis which we perform in
Sec. 3. Lastly, in Sec. 4, we develop an approximate dynamic programming approach
that enables the optimal controls to be computed through simulation, followed by some
concluding remarks.
We now describe the main problem with which we are concerned that is, FT RL.
We later prove an equivalence between the OSPs under worst-case transitions and the
FT RL problem and characterise the solution of each problem.
1.2 Fault-Tolerant Reinforcement Learning
We concern ourselves with finding a policy that copes with abrupt system stoppages and
failures at the worst possible states. Unlike standard methods in RL and game theory
that have fixed time horizons (or purely random exit times) in the following, the process
is stopped by a fictitious adversary that uses a stopping strategy or rule to decide when
to stop given its state observations. In order to generate an FT control, we simulate the
adversary’s action whilst the controller determines its optimal policy. This as we show,
induces a form of control that is an FT best-response control.
A formal description is as follows: an agent exercises actions that influence the
sequence of states visited by the system. At each state, the agent receives a reward
which is dependent on the state and the chosen action. The agent’s actions are selected
by a policy π : S× A→ [0, 1]— a map from the set of states S and the set of actions
A to a probability. We assume that the action set is a discrete compact set and that the
agent’s policy π is drawn from a compact policy set Π . The horizon of the problem is
T ∈ N × {∞}. However, at any given point τS ≤ T the system may stop (randomly)
and the problem terminates where τS ∼ f({0, . . . , T }) is a measurable, random exit
time and f is some distribution on {0, . . . , T }. If after k ≤ T time steps the system
stops, the agent incurs a cost of G(sk) and the process terminates.
For any s ∈ S and for any π ∈ Π , the agent’s performance function is given by:
JτS,π[s] = E
[
τS∧T∑
t=0
γtR(st, at) + γ
τS∧TG(sτS∧T )
∣∣∣∣∣s0 = s, at ∼ π, τS ∼ f({0, . . . , T })
]
,
(1)
where a ∧ b := min{a, b}, E is taken w.r.t. the transition function P . The performance
function (1) consists of a reward functionR : S×A→ R which quantifies the agent’s
immediate reward when the system transitions from one state to the next, a bequest
function G : S → R which quantifies the penalty incurred by the agent when the
system is stopped and γ ∈ [0, 1[, a discount factor. We assume R and G are bounded
and measurable.
The FT control problem which we tackle is one in which the controller acts both
with concern for abrupt system failures and stoppages. In particular, the analysis is per-
formed in sympathy with addressing the problem of how the controller should act in
two scenarios — the first involves acting in environments that are susceptible to adver-
sarial attacks or random stoppages in high costs states. Such situations are often pro-
duced in various real-world scenarios such as engine failures in autonomous vehicles,
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network power failures and digital (communication) networks attacks. The second sce-
nario involves a controller that seeks to avoid system states that yield a high likelihood
of systemic (subcomponent) failure. Examples of this case include an agent that seeks
to avoid performing tasks that increase the risk of some system failure, for example
increasing stress that results in component failure or breakages within robotics.
To produce a control that is robust in these scenarios, it is firstly necessary to de-
termine a stopping rule that stops the system at states that incur the highest overall
costs. Applying this stopping rule to the system subsequently induces a response by the
controller that is robust against systemic faults at states in which stopping inflicts the
greatest overall costs. This necessitates a formalism that combines an OSP to determine
an optimal (adversarial) stopping rule and secondly, a RL problem. Hence, problem we
consider is the following:
Find (kˆ, πˆ) ∈ V×Π and J kˆ,πˆ s.th.
max
π∈Π
(
min
k∈V
Jk,π [s]
)
= J kˆ,πˆ[s], ∀s ∈ S, (2)
where the minimisation is taken pointwise and V is a set of stochastic processes of the
form v : Ω → T where T ⊆ {0, 1, 2 . . .} is a set of stopping times. Note that by
abusive of notation, we use Jv,π to mean Jτ,π for any T ∋ τ ∼ v where v ∈ V. We
also hereon employ the following shorthand R(s, a) ≡ Ras for any s ∈ S and for any
a ∈ A.
The dual objective (2) consists of finding both a stopping rule that minimises J
and an optimal policy that maximises J . By considering the tasks as being delegated
to two individual players, the problem becomes an SG between a controller that seeks
to maximise J by manipulating state visitations through its actions and an adversarial
stopper that chooses a stopping rule to stop the process in order to minimise J . We
later consider a setting in which neither player has up-front knowledge of the transition
model or objective function but each only observes their realised rewards.
The results of this paper also tackle OSPs under a worst-case transitions — prob-
lems in which the goal is to find a stopping rule τˆ under the adverse non-linear expec-
tation EP := min
π∈Π
EP,π s.th.
τˆ ∈ argmax
k∈V
EP
[
k∧T∑
t=0
γtR(st, at) + γ
k∧TG(sk∧T )
]
. (3)
Here, the agent seeks to find an optimal stopping time in a problem in which the
system transitions according to an adversarial (worst-case) probability measure.
1.3 Example: Control with random actuator failure
To elucidate the ideas, we now provide a concrete practical example namely that of
actuator failure within RL applications.
Consider an adaptive learner, for example a robot that uses a set of actuators to
perform actions. Given full operability of its set of actuators, the agent’s actions are
6 David Mguni
determined by a policy π : S × A → [0, 1] which maps from the state space S and
the set of actions A to a probability. In many systems, there exists some risk of actuator
failure at which point the agent thereafter can affect the state transitions by operating
only a subset of its actuators. In this instance, the agent’s can only execute actions
drawn from a subset of its action space Aˆ ⊂ A and hence, the agent is now restricted to
policies of the form πpartial : S × Aˆ → [0, 1] — thereafter its expected return is given
by the value function V πpartial (this plays the role of the bequest function G in (1)). In
order to perform robustly against actuator failure, it is therefore necessary to consider
a set of stopping times T⊆ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and a stopping criterion τˆ : Ω → Twhich
determines the worst states for the agent’s functionality to be impaired so that it can
only use some subset of its set of actuators.
The problem involves finding a pair (τˆ , πˆ) ∈ V×Π — a stopping time and policy
s.th.
min
k′∈V
(
max
π′∈Π
E
[
Hπ
′,k′(s)
])
= E
[
H πˆ,τˆ (s)
]
; ∀s ∈ S,
where s := s0, at ∼ π
′ and Hπ,k(s) :=
∑k∧∞
t=0 γ
tR(st, at) + γ
k∧∞V πpartial(sk∧∞).
Hence the role of the adversary is to determine and execute the stopping action τˆ that
leads to the greatest reduction in the controller’s overall payoff. The controller in turn
learns to execute the policy πˆ which involves playing a policy πˆpartial ∈ argmaxV
πpartial
after the adversary has executed its stopping action. The resulting policy πˆ is hence ro-
bust against actuator failure at the worst possible states.
Embedded within problem (4) is an interdependence between the actions of the
players — that is, the solution to the problem is jointly determined by the actions of
both players and their responses to each other. The appropriate framework to tackle this
problem is therefore an SG (Shapley, 1953).
2 Discrete-Time Stochastic Games of control and stopping
In this setting, the state of the system is determined by a stochastic process {st|t =
0, 1, 2, . . .} whose values are drawn from a state space S ⊆ Rp for some p ∈ N. The
state space is defined on a probability space (Ω,B, P ), where Ω is the sample space,
B is the set of events and P is a map from events to probabilities. We denote by F=
(Fn)n≥0 the filtration over (Ω,B, P ) which is an increasing family of σ−algebras
generated by the random variables s1, s2, . . .. We operate in a Hilbert space V of real-
valued functions on L2, i.e. a complete
2 vector space which we equip with a norm
‖·‖ : V→ R>0×{0} given by ‖f‖µ :=
√
Eµ[f2(s)] and its inner product 〈f, f
T 〉µ :=
Eµ
[
f(s)fT (s)
]
where µ : B(Rn) → [0, 1] is a probability measure. The problem
occurs over a time interval {0, . . .K} where K ∈ N × {∞} is the time horizon. A
stopping time is defined as a random variable τ : Ω → {0, . . . ,K} for which {ω ∈
Ω|τ(ω) ≤ t} ∈ Ft for any t ∈ {0, . . . ,K} — this says that given the information
generated by the state process, we can determine if the stopping criterion has occurred.
2 A vector space is complete if it contains the limit points of all its Cauchy sequences.
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An SG is an augmented Markov decision process which proceeds by two players
tacking actions that jointlymanipulate the transitions of a system overK rounds which
may be infinite. At each round, the players receive some immediate reward or cost
which is a function of the players’ joint actions. The framework is zero-sum so that a
reward for player 1 simultaneously represents a cost for player 2.
Formally, a two-player zero-sum SG is a 6−tuple 〈S,Ai∈{1,2}, P,R, γ〉 where S=
{s1, s2, . . . , sn} is a set of n ∈ N states, Ai is an action set for each player i ∈ {1, 2}.
The map P : S× A1 × A2 × S→ [0, 1] is a Markov transition probability matrix i.e.
P (s′; s, a1, a2) is the probability of the state s
′ being the next state given the system
is in state s and actions a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2 are applied by player 1 and player 2
(resp.). The functionR : S×A1×A2 is the one-step reward for player 1 and represents
one-step cost for player 2 when player 1 takes action a1 ∈ A1 and player 2 takes action
a2 ∈ A2 and γ ∈ [0, 1[ is a discount factor. The goal of each player 1s to maximise its
expected cumulative return — since the game is antagonistic, the total expected reward
received by player 1 which we denote by J , represents a total expected cost for player
2.
Denote by Πi, the space of strategies for each player i ∈ {1, 2} . For standard SGs
with Markovian transition dynamics, we can safely dispense with path dependencies in
the space of strategies. In particular, it is well-known that for SGs, an equilibrium exists
in Markov strategies even when the opponent can draw from non-Markovian strategies
(Hill, 1979).3 Consequently, we focus on the class of behavioural strategies that depend
only on the current state and round, namelyMarkov strategies, hence for each player
i, the strategy spaceΠi consists of strategies of the form πi : S×Ai → [0, 1].
In SGs, it is usual to consider the case A1 = A2 so that the players’ actions are
drawn from the same set. We depart from this model and consider a game in which
player 2 can choose a strategy which determines a time to stop the process contained
within the set T⊆ {0, 1, 2, . . .} which consists of F− measurable stopping times. In
this setting, player 1 can manipulate the system dynamics by taking actions drawn from
A1 (we hereon use A) and at each point, player 2 can decide to intervene to stop the
game.
Let us define by val+[J ] := min
k∈V
max
π∈Π
Jk,π the upper value function and by val−[J ] :=
max
π∈Π
min
k∈V
Jk,π, the lower value function. The upper (lower) value function represents
the minimum payoff that player 1 (player 2) can guarantee itself irrespective of the
actions of the opponent.
The value of the game exists if we can commute themax andmin operators:
val−[J ] = max
π∈Π
min
k∈V
Jk,π = min
k∈V
max
π∈Π
Jk,π = val+[J ]. (4)
We denote the value by J⋆ := val+[J ] = val−[J ] and denote by (kˆ, πˆ) ∈ V× Π
the pair that satisfies J kˆ,πˆ ≡ J⋆. The value, should it exist, is the minimum payoff
each player can guarantee itself under the equilibrium strategy. In general, the functions
val+[J ] and val−[J ] may not coincide. Should J⋆ exist, it constitutes an SPE of the
3 There are some exceptions for games with payoff structures not considered here for example,
limiting average (Ergodic) payoffs (Blackwell and Ferguson, 1968).
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game in which neither player can improve their payoff by playing some other control —
an analogous concept to a Nash equilibrium for the case of two-player zero-sum games.
Thus the central task to establish an equilibrium involves unambiguously assigning a
value to the game, that is proving the existence of J⋆.
3 Main Analysis
In this section, we present the key results and perform the main analysis of the paper.
Our first task is to prove the existence of a value of the game. This establishes a fixed
or stable point which describes the equilibrium policies enacted by each player. Cru-
cially, the equilibrium describes the maximum payoff that the controller can expect in
an environment that is subject to adversarial attacks that stop the system or some sub-
component. Unlike standard SGs with two controllers, introducing a stopping criterion
requires an alternative analysis in which i) an equilibrium with Markov strategies in
which one of the players uses a stopping criterion is determined and ii) the stopping
criterion is characterised. It is well-known that introducing a stopping action to one of
the players alters the analysis of SGs the standard methods of which cannot be directly
applied (c.f. Dynkin games (Dynkin, 1967)).
Our second task is to perform an analysis that enables us to construct an approxi-
mate dynamic programming method. This enables the value function to be computed
through simulation. This, as we show in Sec. 4, underpins a simulation-based scheme
that is suitable for settings in which the transition model and reward function is a pri-
ori unknown. Lastly, we construct an equivalence between robust OSPs and games of
control and stopping. We defer some of the proofs to the appendix.
Our results develop the theory of risk within RL to cover instances in which the
agent has concern the process at a catastrophic system state. Consequently, we develop
the theory of SGs to cover games of control and stopping when neither player has
up-front environment knowledge. We prove an equivalence between robust OSPs and
games of control and stopping and demonstrate how each problem can be solved in
unknown environments.
A central task is to prove that the Bellman operator for the game is a contrac-
tion mapping. Thereafter, we prove convergence to the unique value. Consider a Borel
measurable function which is absolutely integrable w.r.t. the transition kernel P · then
E [J [s′]|Ft] =
∫
S
J [s′]P ass′ , where P
a
ss′ ≡ P (s
′; s, a) is the probability of the state s′
being the next state given the action a ∈ A and the current state is s . In this paper, we
denote by (PJ)(s) :=
∫
S
J [s′]P asds′ .
We now introduce the operator of the game which is of central importance:
TJ [s] := min
{
max
a∈A
Ras + γ
∑
s′∈S
P ass′J
τ,π[s′], G(s)
}
, ∀s ∈ S (5)
The operator T enables the game to be broken down into a sequence of sub minimax
problems. It will later play a crucial role in establishing a value iterative method for
computing the value of the game.
Proposition 1. The operator T in (5) is a contraction.
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Proof. We wish to prove that:
‖TJ − T J¯‖π ≤ γ‖J − J¯‖. (6)
Firstly, we observe that:∥∥∥∥∥maxa∈A
{
Ras + γ
∑
s′∈S
P ass′J
τ,π[s′], G(sk)
}
−
(
max
a∈A
{
Ras + γ
∑
s′∈S
P ass′ J¯
π[s′], G¯(sk)
})∥∥∥∥∥
≤ γmax
a∈A
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
s′∈S
P ass′
(
J
τ,π
s−1[s
′]− J¯πs−1[s
′]
)∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ γ
∥∥Jτ,πs−1 − J¯πs−1∥∥ ,
using Cauchy-Schwartz (and that γ ∈ [0, 1[) and (51). The result follows after applying
Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3.
We now briefly discuss strategies. A player strategy is a map from the opponent’s
policy set to the player’s own policy set. In general, in two player games the player who
performs an action first employs the use of a strategy. Typically, this allows the player
to increase its rewards since their action is now a function of the other player’s later
decisions. Markov controls use only information about the current state and duration
of the game rather than using information about the opponent’s decisions or the game
history. Seemingly, limiting the analysis to Markov controls in the current game may
restrict the abilities of the players to perform optimally.
Our first result however proves the existence of the value in Markov controls:
Theorem 1.
val+[J ] = val−[J ] ≡ J⋆. (7)
Theorem 1 establishes the existence of the game which permits commuting themax
and min operators of the objective (2). Crucially, the theorem secures the existence of
an equilibrium pair (τˆ , πˆ) ∈ V×Π , where πˆ ∈ Π is the controller’s optimalMarkov
policy when it faces adversarial attacks that stop the system. Additionally, Theorem 1
establishes the existence of a given by J⋆, the computation of which, is the subject of
the next section.
Proof of Theorem 1. We begin by noting the following inequality holds:
val+[J ] = min
τ∈T
max
π∈Π
E[Jτ,π[s]] ≥ max
π∈Π
min
τ∈T
E[Jτ,π[s]] = val−[J ]. (8)
The inequality follows by noticing Jk,π ≤ max
π∈Π
Jk,π and thereafter applying the
mink∈T andmaxπ∈Π operators.
The proof can now be settled by reversing the inequality in (8). To begin, choose a
sequence of open intervals {Dm}
∞
m=1 s.th. for each m = 1, 2, . . . D¯m is compact and
D¯m ⊃ D¯m+1 and [0, T ] = ∩
∞
m=1D¯m and define τD(m) := infk∈Dm E[J
k,π [s0]].
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We now observe that:
E[Jτ,πˆ[s]] = max
π∈Π
E

τD(m)∑
t=0
γt(R(st, at) +G(sτD(m)))

 − E

τD(m)∑
t=τ
γt(R(st, at) +G(sτD(m)))


≥ E
[
JτD(m),π[s]
]
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣E

τD(m)∑
t=τ
γt(R(st, at) +G(sτD(m)))


∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ E
[
JτD(m),π[s]
]
−
τD(m)∑
t=τ
γt
∣∣E[R(st, at)] + E [G(sτD(m))]∣∣
≥ E
[
JτD(m),π[s]
]
−
τD(m)∑
t=τ
γt (E [|R(s0, ·)|] + E [|G(s0)|])
= E
[
JτD(m),π[s]
]
+ γτD(m)+1
1− γτ−τD(m)
1− γ
c
= lim
m→∞
inf E[JτD(m),π[s]] + lim
m→∞
[
γτD(m)+1
1− γτ−τD(m)
1− γ
]
c ≥ E[Jτ,π[s]],
where we have used the stationarity property and, in the limit m → ∞ and, in the
last line we used the Fatou lemma. The constant c is given by c := (E[R(s0, ·)] +
E[G(s0)]) ∈ L.
Hence, we now find that
E[Jτ,πˆ[s]] ≥ E[Jτ,π[s]]. (9)
Now since (9) holds ∀π ∈ Π we find that:
E[Jτ,πˆ[s]] ≥ max
π∈Π
E[Jτ,π[s]]. (10)
Lastly, applyingmin operator we observe that:
E[J τˆ ,πˆ[s]] ≥ min
τ∈T
max
π∈Π
E[Jτ,π[s]] = val+[J ]. (11)
It now remains to show the reverse inequality holds:
E[J τˆ ,πˆ[s]] ≤ max
π∈Π
min
τ∈T
E[Jτ,π[s]] = val−[J ]. (12)
Indeed, we observe that
E
[
J τˆ ,πˆ[s]
]
≤ min
τ∈T
E
[
Jτ∧m,πˆ[s]
]
+ E
[
∞∑
t=m
γt (|R(st, at)|+ |G(st)|)
]
(13)
≤ lim
m→∞
[
min
τ∈T
E
[
Jτ∧m,πˆ[s]
]
+ c(m)
]
(14)
= min
τ∈T
E
[
Jτ,πˆ[s]
]
≤ max
π∈Π
min
τ∈T
E [Jτ,π[s]] , (15)
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since γ ∈ [0, 1[,where c(m) := γ
m
1−γ (E[|R(s0, ·)|] + E[|G(s0)|]) (using the stationar-
ity of the state process) and where we have used Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence
Theorem in the penultimate step.
Hence, by (15) we have that:
E
[
J τˆ ,πˆ[s]
]
≤ max
π∈Π
min
τ∈T
E [Jτ,π[s]] = val−[J ]. (16)
Hence putting (11) and (16) together gives:
val−[J ] = max
π∈Π
min
τ∈T
E [Jτ,π[s]]
≥ E[J τˆ ,πˆ[s]] ≥ min
τ∈T
max
π∈Π
E[Jτ,π[s]] = val+[J ]. (17)
After combining (17) with (8) we deduce the thesis.
We can now establish the optimal strategies for each player. To this end, we now
define best-response strategies which shall be useful for further characterising the equi-
librium:
Definition 1. The set of best-response (BR) strategies for player 1 against the stopping
time τ ∈ V (BR strategies for player 2 against the policy π ∈ Π) is defined by:
πˆ ∈ argmax
π′∈Π
E[Jτ,π
′
[s]] (resp.,τˆ ∈ argmin
τ ′∈V
E[Jτ
′,π[s]]), ∀s ∈ S. (18)
The question of computing the value of the game remains. To this end, we now
prove that repeatedly applying T produces a sequence that converges to the value. In
particular, the game has a fixed point property which is stated in the following:
Theorem 2. 1. The sequence (T nJ)∞n=0 converges (in L2).
2. There exists a unique function J⋆ ∈ L2 s.th.
J⋆ = TJ⋆ and lim
n→∞
T nJ = J⋆. (19)
Theorem 2 establishes the existence of a fixed point of T and that the fixed point co-
incides with the value of the game. Crucially, it suggests that J⋆ can be computed by an
iterative application of the Bellman operator which underpins a value iterative method.
We study this aspect in Sec. 4 where we develop an iterative scheme for computing J⋆.
Proof of Theorem 2. Part 1: We note that the contraction property of T (c.f. Prop. 1)
allows us to demonstrate that the game has a unique fixed point to which a sequence
(T nJ)∞n=0 converges (in L2). In particular, by Prop. 1 we have that ‖T
2J − TJ‖ ≤
γ‖TJ − J‖ which proves that the sequence (T nJ)∞n=0 converges to a fixed point.
Part 2:We observe that the fixed point is unique since if ∃J,M ∈ L2 s.th. TJ = J
and TM = M we find that ‖M − J‖ = ‖TM − TJ‖ = γ‖M − J‖, so thatM = J
(since γ ∈ [0, 1[) which gives the desired result.
Adopting notions in dynamic programming, denote by:
T nJ [s] = min
τ∈T
max
π0,π1,...,πn−1
E

{n−1∧τ}∑
t=0
γtR(st, at) + γ
nJ(sn∧τ )

 .
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We begin the proof by invoking similar reasoning as (13) - (14) to deduce that:
E
[
J τˆ ,πˆ[s]
]
≤ min
τ∈T
E
[
Jτ∧n,πˆ[s]
]
+
γn
1− γ
c,
where c := (E[|R(s0, ·)|] + E[|G(s0)|]). Hence,
T nJ [s] ≤ max
π∈Π
min
τ∈T
E [Jτ,π[s]] +
γn
1− γ
c = J⋆[s] +
γn
1− γ
c. (20)
By analogous reasoning we can deduce that:
T nJ [s] ≥ min
τ∈T
max
π∈Π
E [Jτ,π[s]]−
γn
1− γ
c = J⋆[s]−
γn
1− γ
c. (21)
Putting (20) and (21) together implies:
J⋆[s]−
γn
1− γ
c ≤ T nJ [s] ≤ J⋆[s] +
γn
1− γ
c. (22)
By Lemma A.7, i.e. invoking the monotonicity and constant shift properties of T , we
can apply T to (22) and preserve the inequalities to give:
TJ⋆[s]−
γn
1− γ
c ≤ T n+1J [s] ≤ TJ⋆[s] +
γn
1− γ
c. (23)
After taking the limit in (23) and, using the sandwich theorem of calculus, we deduce
the result.
Definition 2. The pair (τˆ , πˆ) ∈ V×Π is an SPE iff:
J τˆ ,πˆ[s] = max
π∈Π
J τˆ ,π[s] = min
τ∈V
Jτ,πˆ[s], ∀s ∈ S. (24)
An SPE therefore defines a strategic configuration in which both players play their
BR strategies. With reference to the FT RL problem, an SPE describes a scenario in
which the controller optimally responds against stoppages at the set of states that inflict
the greatest costs to the controller. In particular, we will demonstrate that πˆ ∈ Π is a
BR to a system that undergoes adversarial attacks.
Proposition 2. The pair (τˆ , πˆ) ∈ V×Π consists of BR strategies and constitutes an
SPE.
Proof. The proposition follows from the fact that if either player plays a Markov strat-
egy then their opponent’s best-response is a Markov strategy. Moreover, τˆ is a BR strat-
egy for player 2 (recall Definition 3). Moreover, by Theorem 1 (commuting the max
andmin operators) we observe that πˆ is a BR strategy for player 1.
By Prop. 2, when the pair (τˆ , πˆ) is played, each player executes its BR strategy.
The strategic response then induces FT behaviour by the controller. We now turn to
the existence and characterising the optimal stopping time for player 2. The following
result establishes its existence.
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Theorem 3. There exists an F-measurable stopping time:
τˆ = min
{
k ∈ T
∣∣∣G(sk) ≤ min
v∈V
max
π∈Π
Jv,π [sk]
}
, a.s.
The theorem characterises and establishes the existence of the player 2 optimal
stopping time which, when executed by the adversary, induces an FT control by the
controller.
Proof of Theorem 3. For anym ∈ N we have that:
max
π∈Π
Jτ,π[s]≥ max
π∈Π
Jτ∧m,π[s]−
∞∑
t=m
γtmax
π∈Π
(|R(st, at)|+ |G(st)|) . (25)
We now apply the min operator to both sides of (25) which gives:
min
τ∈T
max
π∈Π
Jτ,π[s] ≥ min
τ∈T
max
π∈Π
Jτ∧m,π[s]−
∞∑
t=m
γtmax
π∈Π
(|R(st, at)|+ |G(st)|) .
After taking expectations, we find that:
E
[
min
τ∈T
max
π∈Π
Jτ,π[s]
]
(26)
≥ E
[
min
τ∈T
max
π∈Π
Jτ∧m,π[s]
]
−
∞∑
t=m
γtE
[
max
π∈Π
(|R(st, at)|+ |G(st)|)
]
. (27)
Now by Jensen’s inequality and, using the stationarity of the state process (recall the
expectation is taken under π) we have that:
E
[
max
π∈Π
(|R(st, at)|+ |G(st)|)
]
≥ max
π∈Π
E [(|R(st, at)|+ |G(st)|)] = E[|R(s0, ·)|] + E[|G(s0)|]. (28)
By standard arguments of dynamic programming, the value of the game with horizon n
can be obtained from n iterations of the dynamic recursion; in particular, we have that:
min
τ∈T
max
π∈Π
Jτ∧m,π[s] = TmG(s). (29)
Inserting (28) and (29) into (27) gives:
E
[
min
τ∈T
max
π∈Π
Jτ,π[s]
]
≥ E [TmG(s)]− c(m)
= lim
m→∞
[E [TmG(s)]− c(m)] = E
[
J τˆ ,πˆ[s]
]
, (30)
where c(m) := γ
m
1−γ (E[|R(s0, ·)|]+E[|G(s0)|]) so that limm→∞
c(m) = 0. Hence, we find
that:
E
[
J τˆ ,πˆ[s]
]
≤ E
[
min
τ∈T
max
π∈Π
Jτ,π[s]
]
, (31)
we deduce the result after noting that G(sτ ) = J
τ,·[sτ ] by definition of G.
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Having shown the existence of the optimal stopping time τ⋆, by Theorem 3 and
Theorem 1, we find:
Theorem 4. Let τˆ be the player 2 optimal stopping time defined in (3) and let τ⋆ be the
optimal stopping time for the robust OSP (c.f. (3)) then τ⋆ = τˆ .
Theorem 4 establishes an equivalence between the robust OSP and the SG of control
and stopping hence, any method that computes τˆ for the SG yields a solution to the
robust OSP.
4 Simulation-Based Value Iteration
We now develop a simulation-based value-iterative scheme. We show that the method
produces an iterative sequence that converges to the value of the game from which the
optimal controls can be extracted. The method is suitable for environments in which
the transition model and reward functions are not known to either player. We defer the
proofs of this section to the appendix.
The fixed point property of the game established in Theorem 2 immediately sug-
gests a solution method for finding the value. In particular, we may seek to solve the
fixed point equation (FPE) J⋆ = TJ⋆. Direct approaches at solving the FPE are not
generally fruitful as closed solutions are typically unavailable. To compute the value
function, we develop an iterative method that tunes weights of a set of basis functions
{φk : R
p → R|k ∈ 1, 2, . . .D} to approximate J⋆ through simulated system trajec-
tories and associated costs. Algorithms of this type were first introduced by Watkins
(Watkins and Dayan, 1992) as an approximate dynamic programmingmethod and have
since been augmented to cover various settings. Therefore the following can be consid-
ered as a generalised Q-learning algorithm for zero-sum controller stopper games.
Let us denote by Φr :=
∑D
j=1 r(j)φj an operator representation of the basis expan-
sion. The algorithm is initialised with weight vector r0 = (r0(1), . . . , r0(P ))
′ ∈ Rd.
Then as the trajectory {st|t = 0, 1, 2, . . .} is simulated, the algorithm produces an up-
dated series of vectors {rt|t = 0, 1, 2, . . .} by the update:
rt+1 = rt + γφ(st)
(
max
a∈A
Rast + γmin {(φrt)(st+1), G(st+1)} − (φrt)(st)
)
.
Theorem 5 demonstrates that the method converges to an approximation of J⋆. We
provide a bound for the approximation error in terms of the basis choice.
We define the functionQ⋆ which the algorithm approximates by:
Q⋆(s) = max
a∈A
Ras + γPJ
⋆[s], ∀s ∈ S (32)
We later show that Q⋆ serves to approximate the value J⋆. In particular, we show
that the algorithm generates a sequence of weights rn that converge to a vector r
⋆ and
that Φr⋆, in turn approximates Q⋆. To complete the connection, we provide a bound
between the outcome of the game when the players use controls generated by the algo-
rithm.
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We introduce our player 2 stopping criterion which now takes the form:
τˆ = min{t|G(st) ≤ Q
⋆(st)}. (33)
Let us define a orthogonal projectionΠ and the function F by the following:
ΠQ := argmin
Q¯∈{Φr|r∈Rp}
‖Q¯−Q‖, FQ := max
a∈A
Ras + γP min{G,Q}. (34)
We now state the main results of the section:
Theorem 5. rn converges to r
⋆ where r⋆ is the unique solution:ΠF (Φr⋆) = Φr⋆.
The following results provide approximation bounds when employing the projec-
tionΠ :
Theorem 6. Let τˆ = min
{
k ∈ V
∣∣∣G(sk) ≤ (Φr⋆)(sk)}, then the following hold:
‖Φr⋆ −Q⋆‖ ≤
(√
1− γ2
)−1
‖ΠQ⋆ −Q⋆‖ , (35)
E
[
J⋆ − J τ˜ ,π˜
]
≤ 2
[
(1− γ)
√
1− γ2)
]−1
‖ΠQ⋆ −Q⋆‖ . (36)
Hence the error bound in approximation of J⋆ is determined by the goodness of the
projection.
Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 thus enable the FT RL problem to be solved by way
of simulating the behaviour of the environment and using the update rule (32) to ap-
proximate the value function. Applying the stopping rule in (33), by Theorem 6 and
Theorem 2, means the pair (τ˜ , π˜) is generated where the policy π˜ approximates the
policy πˆ which is FT against adversarial stoppages and faults.
Conclusion
In this paper, we tackled the problem of fault-tolerance within RL in which the con-
troller seeks to obtain a control that is robust against catastrophic failures. To formally
characterise the optimal behaviour, we constructed a new discrete-time SG of control
and stopping.We established the existence of an equilibrium value then, using a contrac-
tion mapping argument, showed that the game can be solved by iterative application of
a Bellman operator and constructed an approximate dynamic programming algorithm
so that the game can be solved by simulation.
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Appendix
Assumptions
Our results are built under the following assumptions:
Assumption A.1. Stationarity: the expectations E are taken w.r.t. a stationary distribu-
tion so that for any measurable function f we have E [f(s)] = E [f(sk)] for any k ≥ 0
where s := s0.
Assumption A.2. Ergodicity: i) Any invariant random variable of the state process is
P−almost surely (P−a.s.) a constant.
Assumption A.3. Markovian transition dynamics: the transition probability function P
satisfies the following equality: P (sk+1 ∈ A|Fk) = P (sk+1, A) for any A ∈ B(R
p).
Assumption A.4. The constituent functions {R,G} in J are square integrable: that is,
R,G ∈ L2(µ).
Additional Lemmata
We begin the analysis with some preliminary lemmata and definitions which are useful
for proving the main results.
Definition A.1. An operator T : V→ V is said to be a contraction w.r.t a norm ‖ · ‖
if there exists a constant c ∈ [0, 1[ s.th for any V1, V2 ∈ Vwe have that:
‖TV1 − TV2‖ ≤ c‖V1 − V2‖. (37)
Definition A.2. An operator T : V→ V is non-expansive if ∀V1, V2 ∈ Vwe have:
‖TV1 − TV2‖ ≤ ‖V1 − V2‖. (38)
Definition A.3. The residual of a vector V ∈ Vw.r.t the operator T : V→ V is:
ǫT (V ) := ‖TV − V ‖. (39)
Lemma A.1. Define val+[f ] := minb∈B maxa∈A f(a, b) and define
val−[f ] := maxa∈A minb∈B f(a, b), then for any b ∈ B we have that for any f, g ∈ L
and for any c ∈ R>0:∣∣∣∣maxa∈A f(a, b)−maxa∈A g(a, b)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c =⇒ ∣∣val−[f ]− val−[g]∣∣ ≤ c.
Lemma A.2. For any f, g, h ∈ L and for any c ∈ R>0 we have that:
‖f − g‖ ≤ c =⇒ ‖min{f, h} −min{g, h}‖ ≤ c.
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Lemma A.3. Let the functions f, g, h ∈ L then
‖max{f, h} −max{g, h}‖ ≤ ‖f − g‖. (40)
The following lemma, whose proof is deferred is a required result for proving the
contraction mapping property of the operator T .
Lemma A.4. The probability transition kernel P is non-expansive, that is:
‖PV1 − PV2‖ ≤ ‖V1 − V2‖. (41)
The following estimates provide bounds on the value J⋆ which we use later in the
development of the iterative algorithm.We defer the proof of the results to the appendix.
Lemma A.5. Let T : V→ V be a contraction mapping in ‖ · ‖ and let J⋆ be a fixed
point so that TJ⋆ = J⋆ then there exists a constant c ∈ [0, 1[ s.th:
‖J⋆ − J‖ ≤ (1− c)−1ǫT (J). (42)
Lemma A.6. Let T1 : V→ V, T2 : V→ V be contraction mappings and suppose
there exists vectors J⋆1 , J
⋆
2 s.th T1J
⋆
1 = J
⋆
1 and T2J
⋆
2 = J
⋆
2 (i.e. J
⋆
1 , J
⋆
2 are fixed points
w.r.t T1 and T2 respectively) then ∃c1, c2 ∈ [0, 1[ s.th:
‖J⋆1 − J
⋆
2 ‖ ≤ (1− {c1 ∧ c2})
−1
(ǫT1(J)− ǫT2(J)) .
Lemma A.7. The operator T satisfies the following:
1. (Monotonicity) For any J1, J2 ∈ L2 s.th. J1(s) ≤ J2(s) then TJ1 ≤ TJ2.
2. (Constant shift) Let I(s) ≡ 1 be the unit function, then for any J ∈ L2 and for any
scalar α ∈ R, T satisfies T (J + αI)(s) = TJ(s) + αI(s).
Proof of Results
Proof of Lemma A.1. We begin by noting the following inequality for any f : V×V→
R, g : V× V→ R s.th. f, g ∈ L we have that for all b ∈ V:∣∣∣∣maxa∈V f(a, b)−maxa∈V g(a, b)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxa∈V |f(a, b)− g(a, b)| . (43)
From (43) we can straightforwardly derive the fact that for any b ∈ V:∣∣∣∣mina∈Vf(a, b)−mina∈Vg(a, b)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxa∈V |f(a, b)− g(a, b)| , (44)
(this can be seen by negating each of the functions in (43) and using the properties of
themax operator).
Assume that for any b ∈ V the following inequality holds:
max
a∈V
|f(a, b)− g(a, b)| ≤ c (45)
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Since (44) holds for any b ∈ Vand, by (43), we have in particular that∣∣∣∣maxb∈V mina∈Vf(a, b)−maxb∈V mina∈V g(a, b)
∣∣∣∣
≤ max
b∈V
∣∣∣∣mina∈V f(a, b)−mina∈V g(a, b)
∣∣∣∣
≤ max
b∈V
max
a∈V
|f(a, b)− g(a, b)| ≤ c, (46)
whenever (45) holds which gives the required result.
Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3 are given without proof but can be straightforwardly
checked.
Proof of Lemma A.4. The proof is standard, we give the details for the sake of comple-
tion. Indeed, using the Tonelli-Fubini theorem and the iterated law of expectations, we
have that:
‖PJ‖2 = E
[
(PJ)2[s0]
]
= E
(
[E [J [s1]|s0])
2
]
≤ E
[
E
[
J2[s1]|s0
]]
= E
[
J2[s1]
]
= ‖J‖2,
where we have used Jensen’s inequality to generate the inequality. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Lemma A.5. The proof follows almost immediately from the triangle inequal-
ity, indeed for any J ∈ L2:
‖J⋆ − J‖ = ‖TJ⋆ − J‖ ≤ γ‖J⋆ − J‖+ ‖TJ − J‖, (47)
where we have added and subtracted TJ to produce the inequality. The result then
follows after inserting the definition of ǫT (J).
Proof of Lemma A.6. The proof follows directly from Lemma A.5. Indeed, we observe
that for any J ∈ L2 we have
‖J⋆1 − J
⋆
2 ‖ ≤ ‖J
⋆
1 − J‖+ ‖J
⋆
2 − J‖, (48)
where we have added and subtracted J to produce the inequality. The result then follows
from Lemma A.5.
Proof of Lemma A.7. Part 2 immediately follows from the properties of the max and
min operators. It remains only to prove part 1.
We seek to prove that for any s ∈ S, if J ≤ J¯ then
min
τ∈T
{
max
a∈A
Ras + γ
∑
s′∈S
P ass′J
τ,π[s′], G(Sτ )
}
−min
τ∈T
{
max
a∈A
Ras + γ
∑
s′∈S
P ass′ J¯
π[s′], G(Sτ )
}
≤ 0
(49)
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We begin by firstly making the following observations:
1. For any x, y, h ∈ V
x ≤ y =⇒ min{x, h} ≤ min{y, h}. (50)
2. For any f, g, h ∈ L2∣∣∣∣maxx∈V f(x)−maxx∈V g(x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxx∈V |f(x)− g(x)| . (51)
Assume that J ≤ J¯ , then we observe that:
max
a∈A
{
Ras + γ
∑
s′∈S
P ass′J
τ,π[s′]
}
−max
a∈A
{
Ras + γ
∑
s′∈S
P ass′ J¯
π[s′]
}
(52)
≤ γmax
a∈A
{∑
s′∈S
P ass′
(
Jτ,π[s′]− J¯π[s′]
)}
= γ
(
(PJ)−
(
P J¯
))
≤ J − J¯ ≤ 0,
where we have used (51) in the penultimate line. The result immediately follows after
applying (50).
The proofs of the results in Sec. 4 are constructed in a similar fashion that in (Bert-
sekas, 2008) (approximate dynamic programming). However, the analysis incorporates
some important departures due to the need to accommodate the actions of two players
that operate antagonistically.
We now prove the first of the two results of Sec. 4.
Proof of Theorem 5. We firstly notice the construction of τˆ given by
τˆ = min{t|G(st) ≤ Q
⋆}, (53)
is sensible since we observe that
min{t|G(st) ≤ J
⋆}
=min{t|G(st) ≤ min{G(st), Q
⋆(st)}
=min{t|G(st) ≤ Q
⋆}.
Result 1
Step 1 Our first step is to prove the following bound:∥∥FQ− FQ¯∥∥ ≤ γ ∥∥Q− Q¯∥∥ . (54)
Proof. ∥∥∥∥maxa∈A Ras + γP min{G,Q} −
(
max
a∈A
Ras + γP min{G, Q¯}
)∥∥∥∥
= γ
∥∥P min{G,Q} − P min{G, Q¯}∥∥
≤ γ
∥∥min {G,Q} −min {G, Q¯}∥∥
≤ γ
∥∥Q− Q¯∥∥ .
which is the required result.
Cutting Your Losses 23
Step 2
Our next task is to prove that the quantity Q⋆ is a fixed point of F and hence we can
apply the operator F to achieve the approximation of the value.
Proof. Using the definition of T (c.f. (13) we find that:
J⋆ = TJ⋆ ⇐⇒ max
a∈A
Ras + γPJ
⋆
= max
a∈A
Ras + γP min
{
max
a∈A
Ras + γPJ,G
}
⇐⇒
Q⋆ = max
a∈A
Ras + γP min {Q
⋆, G}
⇐⇒
Q⋆ = FQ⋆.
Step 3
We now prove that the operatorΠF is a contraction onQ, that is the following inequal-
ity holds: ∥∥ΠFQ−ΠFQ¯∥∥ ≤ γ ∥∥Q− Q¯∥∥ .
Proof. The proof follows straightforwardly by the properties of a projection mapping:∥∥ΠFQ−ΠFQ¯∥∥ ≤ ∥∥FQ− FQ¯∥∥ ≤ γ ∥∥Q− Q¯∥∥ .
Step 4
‖Φr⋆ −Q⋆‖ ≤
1√
1− γ2
‖ΠQ⋆ −Q⋆‖ . (55)
The result is proven using the orthogonality of the (orthogonal) projection and by the
Pythagorean theorem. Indeed, we have that:
Proof.
‖Φr⋆ −Q⋆‖
2
=
∥∥Φr⋆ −ΠQ⋆‖2 + ‖ΠQ⋆ −Q⋆∥∥2
= ‖ΠFΦr⋆ −ΠQ⋆‖2 + ‖ΠQ⋆ −Q⋆‖2
= ‖ΠFΦr⋆ −ΠQ⋆‖
2
+ ‖ΠQ⋆ −Q⋆‖
2
≤ γ2 ‖Φr⋆ −Q⋆‖
2
+ ‖ΠQ⋆ −Q⋆‖
2
.
Hence, we find that
‖Φr⋆ −Q⋆‖ ≤
1√
1− γ2
‖ΠQ⋆ −Q⋆‖ ,
which is the required result.
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Result 2
E [J⋆[s]]− E
[
J τ˜ ,π˜[s]
]
≤
2
[(1− γ)
√
1− γ2]
‖ΠQ⋆ −Q⋆‖. (56)
Proof. The proof by Jensen’s inequality, stationarity and the non-expansive property of
P . In particular, we have
E [J⋆[s]]− E
[
J τ˜ ,π˜[s]
]
= E [PJ⋆[s]]− E
[
PJ τ˜ ,π˜[s]
]
≤
∣∣E [PJ⋆[s]]− E [PJ τ˜ ,π˜[s]]∣∣
≤ ‖PJ − PJ τ˜ ,π˜‖. (57)
Inserting the definitions of Q⋆ and Q˜ into (57) then gives:
E [J⋆[s]]− E
[
J τ˜ ,π˜[s]
]
≤
1
γ
‖Q⋆ − Q˜‖. (58)
It remains therefore to place a bound on the term ‖Q⋆ − Q˜. We observe that by the
triangle inequality and the fixed point properties of F on Q and F˜ on Q˜ we have
‖Q⋆ − Q˜‖ ≤ ‖Q⋆ − F (Φr⋆)‖+ ‖Q˜− F (Φr⋆)‖ (59)
≤ γ
{
‖Q⋆ − Φr⋆‖+ ‖Q˜− Φr⋆‖
}
(60)
≤ γ
{
2‖Q⋆ − Φr⋆‖+ ‖Q⋆ − Q˜‖
}
. (61)
So that
‖Q⋆ − Q˜‖ ≤
2γ
1− γ
‖Q⋆ − Φr⋆‖. (62)
The result then follows after substituting the result of step 4 (55).
Let us now define the following quantity:
HQ(s) :=
{
G(s) if G(s) ≤ (Φr⋆)(s)
Q(s) otherwise,
(63)
and
F˜Q := max
a∈A
Ras + γPHQ. (64)
Step 5
∥∥∥F˜Q− F˜ Q¯∥∥∥ ≤ γ ∥∥Q− Q¯∥∥ (65)
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Proof.
∥∥∥F˜Q− F˜ Q¯∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥∥maxa∈A Ras + γPHQ−
(
max
a∈A
Ras + γPHQ¯
)∥∥∥∥
= γ
∥∥PHQ− PHQ¯∥∥
≤ γ
∥∥HQ−HQ¯∥∥
= γ
∥∥min{G,Q} −min{G, Q¯}∥∥
≤ γ
∥∥Q− Q¯∥∥ .
We now prove that Q˜ = max
a∈A
Ras + γPJ
π,τ˜ is a fixed point.
HQ˜ = H
(
max
a∈A
Ras + γPJ
π,τ˜
)
=
{
G(s) if G(s) ≤ (Φr⋆)(s)
max
a∈A
Ras + γPJ
π,τ˜ otherwise
= Jπ,τ˜
Let us now define the following quantity:
s(z, r) := φ(s)
(
max
a∈A
Ras + γmin {(Φr)(y), G(y)} − (Φr)(s)
)
.
Additionally, we define s¯ by the following:
s¯(z, r) := E [s(z0, r)] .
The components of s(z, r) are then given by:
sk ≡ E
[
φk(s0)
(
max
a∈A
Ras + γmin {(φr)(s0), G(s0)} − (φr)(s0)
)]
.
We now observe that sk can be described in terms of an inner product. Indeed, using
the iterated law of expectations we have that
sk ≡ E
[
Φk(s0)
(
max
a∈A
Ras + γmin {(Φr)(s0), G(s0)} − (Φr)(s0)
)]
= E
[
Φk(s0)
(
max
a∈A
Ras + γE [min {(Φr)(s0), G(s0)} |s0]− (Φr)(s0)
)]
= E
[
Φk(s0)
(
max
a∈A
Ras + γP min {(Φr)(s0), G(s0)} − (Φr)(s0)
)]
= 〈Φk, F (Φr) − F (Φr)〉 .
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Proof of Theorem 6. Step 5 enables us to use classic arguments for approximate dy-
namic programming. In particular, following step 5, Theorem 6 follows directly from
Theorem 2 in (Tsitsiklis & Van Roy, 1999) with only a minor adjustment in substituting
themax operator withmin.
